放射治疗连续性准备:针对网络攻击应急计划的调查研究
该研究通过电子邮件向美国150个放射治疗科室(含105个治疗医学物理住院医师培训项目机构和45个社区机构)发放含5个问题的问卷,评估对网络攻击应急计划的认知与准备情况。43份可评估回复显示,42%的受访者表示充分了解该概念,大医院(≥5台治疗机)认知度54%高于小医院(≤4台)的24%(P<.05),62%的大医院正在准备或评估应急计划而小医院仅29%(P=.03),且无受访者明确表示已制定应急计划。结论认为放射治疗领域对网络攻击准备的重视程度似乎不足,小医院的认知和准备均大幅低于大医院。
要点
- 42%的受访者充分了解网络攻击应急计划概念,大医院认知度54%高于小医院24%(P<.05)。
- 58%的受访者认为制定应急计划「必要」,28%认为「理想但不实际」,9%认为不必要。
- 62%的大医院正在准备或评估应急计划,仅29%的小医院如此(P=.03),无受访者已制定应急计划。
核心结论
- 放射治疗领域对网络攻击准备的重视程度似乎不足。
- 小医院在认知和准备方面均大幅低于大医院。
- 需要开展有针对性的持续教育并制定相应计划,以应对日益普遍和复杂的网络攻击威胁。
研究设计与样本
- 调查研究:通过电子邮件向150个放射治疗科室发放含5个问题的问卷。
- 收件机构包括105个经治疗医学物理教育项目认证委员会列出的拥有治疗医学物理住院医师培训项目的机构,以及美国境内45个代表社区实践的其他较小机构。
- 共43份回复被认定可评估用于分析。
主要发现
- 42%(18名受访者)表示充分了解网络攻击应急计划的概念。
- 大医院(拥有5台及以上治疗机)认知度为54%,小医院(拥有4台及以下)为24%(P<.05)。
- 58%的受访者认为制定该计划「必要」,28%认为「理想但不实际」,9%认为不必要;不同机构类型或规模间在此问题上无显著差异。
- 62%的大医院表示正在准备或评估应急计划,小医院仅29%(P=.03)。
- 无受访者明确表示其实践中已制定应急计划。
以上解读依据论文摘要(全文未开放获取或许可不允许翻译转载)。
原文
PURPOSE: Cyberattacks on health care systems have been on the rise over the past 5 years. Formulation and implementation of a robust postattack business continuity plan and/or contingency plan (CP) is essential for minimal disruption to patient care. The level of awareness and planning within the radiation oncology community for cyberattacks is not clear. This study was undertaken to survey and assess cyberattack CP awareness and preparedness. METHODS AND MATERIALS: A survey instrument comprising 5 questions on awareness and preparedness of cyberattack CPs was e-mailed to 150 radiation oncology departments. Recipients included 105 institutions with residency programs in therapeutic medical physics, as listed by the Commission on Accreditation of Medical Physics Education Program (usually either school-based or large institutional settings), and 45 additional smaller settings within the United States, representing community practices. RESULTS: Forty-three responses were deemed evaluable for analysis. Forty-two percent (18 respondents) of respondents responded that they are well-aware of the concept of a cyberattack CP. A large discrepancy in awareness exists between larger hospitals (LH) that have 5 or more treatment machines and smaller hospitals (SH) that have 4 or fewer, 54% versus 24 % (P < .05). Fifty-eight percent of respondents considered it "essential" to have such a plan in place, and 28% considered it "desirable" to do so but not practical. Nine percent regarded a cyberattack CP as unnecessary. No significant differences in responses were noted among different types or sizes of institutions on this issue. Sixty-two percent of LH responded that they were either preparing or evaluating a CP, compared with only 29% of SH (P = .03). However, no respondents explicitly replied that they already had a CP in place in their practices. CONCLUSIONS: The importance of cyberattack preparedness and implementation does not seem to be well-recognized in radiation oncology. Both the awareness and the preparedness of SH are substantially less than those of LH. Specific and ongoing education efforts in parallel with development of appropriate programs are needed to counter the increasingly pervasive and complex threat of cyberattacks.
引用
- Yi B, Sawant A, Chen S, et al. Readiness for Radiation Treatment Continuity: Survey on Contingency Plans Against Cyberattacks. Adv Radiat Oncol. 2022. PMID: 36148373. doi:10.1016/j.adro.2022.100990
供执业医师工作参考,不替代临床判断;数值与分级以指南原文为准。