文献速递免疫规划卫生政策与健康促进

可治疗传染病的预防:博弈论方法

Prevention of treatable infectious diseases: A game-theoretic approach.
PubMed 文献 · Vaccine · 2017-08-31

该研究构建数学模型,结合个体接种决策的博弈与疾病传播的 compartmental 模型,分析不完美疫苗(仅对部分接种者提供有限保护)下自愿接种的群体结果。模型得出有效接种覆盖率随预防与治疗相对成本变化的特征,并识别出三种行为,其中相对成本足够低时疫情可被预防所避免,但疾病消除仅是暂时的,且随感知成本上升可逆转至有效再生数为1的疫情边缘。研究以麻疹流行病学为应用示例。

要点

  • 相对成本过高时个体不接种疫苗。
  • 相对成本中等时部分个体接种,自愿接种可缓解疫情,覆盖率随成本降低而稳步上升。
  • 相对成本足够低时疫情可被避免,但疾病消除仅是暂时的。

核心结论

  • 在相对成本足够低时,即使疫苗不完美,疫情也可通过预防避免,但疾病消除仅是暂时的,且随感知成本上升可逆转至有效再生数为1的疫情边缘。

研究设计与样本

  • 数学建模研究,结合单玩家个体接种决策博弈与 compartmental 疾病传播模型。

主要发现

  • 相对成本过高时个体不接种疫苗。
  • 相对成本中等时部分个体接种,自愿接种缓解疫情,且接种覆盖率随相对成本降低而稳步上升。
  • 相对成本足够低时疫情可被避免,但疾病消除仅是暂时的,随感知成本上升可逆转至有效再生数为1的疫情边缘。

局限性

  • 疾病消除仅是暂时的,该情形下个体策略不存在均衡,且随感知成本上升可逆转至疫情边缘。

以上解读依据论文摘要(全文未开放获取或许可不允许翻译转载)。

原文

We model outcomes of voluntary prevention using an imperfect vaccine, which confers protection only to a fraction of vaccinees for a limited duration. Our mathematical model combines a single-player game for the individual-level decision to get vaccinated, and a compartmental model for the epidemic dynamics. Mathematical analysis yields a characterization for the effective vaccination coverage, as a function of the relative cost of prevention versus treatment; note that cost may involve monetary as well as non-monetary aspects. Three behaviors are possible. First, the relative cost may be too high, so individuals do not get vaccinated. Second, the relative cost may be moderate, such that some individuals get vaccinated and voluntary vaccination alleviates the epidemic. In this case, the vaccination coverage grows steadily with decreasing relative cost of vaccination versus treatment. Unlike previous studies, we find a third case where relative cost is sufficiently low so epidemics may be averted through the use of prevention, even for an imperfect vaccine. However, we also found that disease elimination is only temporary-as no equilibrium exists for the individual strategy in this third case-and, with increasing perceived cost of vaccination versus treatment, the situation may be reversed toward the epidemic edge, where the effective reproductive number is 1. Thus, maintaining relative cost sufficiently low will be the main challenge to maintain disease elimination. Furthermore, our model offers insight on vaccine parameters, which are otherwise difficult to estimate. We apply our findings to the epidemiology of measles.

来源:Vaccine,查看原文。版权归原作者所有。

引用

  1. Jijón S, Supervie V, Breban R, et al. Prevention of treatable infectious diseases: A game-theoretic approach. Vaccine. 2017. PMID: 28863868. doi:10.1016/j.vaccine.2017.08.040

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