文献速递卫生政策与健康促进

不处方抗生素的经济激励措施的后果:日本全国性准实验

The consequence of financial incentives for not prescribing antibiotics: a Japan's nationwide quasi-experiment.
PubMed 文献 · Int J Epidemiol · 2022-01-01

日本于2018年4月在儿科诊所试点实施经济激励政策,对符合条件的医疗机构在不处方抗生素时给予奖励。该准实验采用倾向性评分匹配的倍差法分析发现,激励政策与抗生素处方量相对减少17.8%相关,且未导致非工作时间就诊或住院增加。

要点

  • 每例800日元(约7.3美元)奖励与抗生素处方相对减少17.8%相关。
  • 同时伴随呼吸系统症状药物和抗组胺药处方减少。
  • 非工作时间就诊和住院无超额增加。

核心结论

  • 对医疗机构不处方抗生素的经济激励与抗生素处方减少相关,且未产生不良医疗后果。
  • 日本的新卫生政策提供了通过相对较小的经济激励立即减少不适当抗生素处方的政策选项。

研究设计与样本

  • 准实验、倾向性评分匹配、倍差法(DID)设计。
  • 数据包括10180家符合或不符合条件的机构中553138名患者的9253261例感染病例。

主要发现

  • 与不符合条件的机构相比,符合条件机构引入经济激励与抗生素处方超额减少相关:DID估计值为每1000例减少228.6个治疗日(DOTs)(95%CI,-272.4至-184.9),相当于相对减少17.8%(95%CI,14.8至20.7)。
  • 引入经济激励还与呼吸系统症状药物超额减少相关:DID估计值为每1000例减少256.9个DOTs(95%CI,-379.3至-134.5);以及抗组胺药超额减少:DID估计值为每1000例减少198.5个DOTs(95%CI,-282.1至-114.9)。
  • 非工作时间就诊无超额增加:DID估计值为每1000例减少4.43次事件(95%CI,-12.8至3.97)。
  • 住院无超额增加:DID估计值为每1000例减少0.08次事件(95%CI,-0.48至0.31)。

临床怎么用

  • 原文未据此给出推荐。

局限性

  • 原文未报告局限性。

以上解读依据论文摘要(全文未开放获取或许可不允许翻译转载)。

原文

BACKGROUND: For addressing antibiotic overuse, Japan designed a health care policy in which eligible medical facilities could claim a financial reward when antibiotics were not prescribed for early-stage respiratory and gastrointestinal infections. The policy was introduced in a pilot manner in paediatric clinics in April 2018. METHODS: We conducted a quasi-experimental, propensity score-matched, difference-in-differences (DID) design to determine whether the nationwide financial incentives for appropriate non-prescribing of antibiotics as antimicrobial stewardship [800 JPY (≈7.3 US D) per case] were associated with changes in prescription patterns, including antibiotics, and health care use in routine paediatric health care settings at a national level. Data consisted of 9 253 261 cases of infectious diseases in 553 138 patients treated at 10 180 eligible or ineligible facilities. RESULTS: A total of 2959 eligible facilities claimed 316 770 cases for financial incentives and earned 253 million JPY (≈2.29 million USD). Compared with ineligible facilities, the introduction of financial incentives in the eligible facilities was associated with an excess reduction in antibiotic prescriptions [DID estimate, -228.6 days of therapy (DOTs) per 1000 cases (95% CI, -272.4 to -184.9), which corresponded to a relative reduction of 17.8% (95% CI, 14.8 to 20.7)]. The introduction was also associated with excess reductions in drugs for respiratory symptoms [DID estimates, -256.9 DOTs per 1000 cases (95% CI, -379.3 to -134.5)] and antihistamines [DID estimate, -198.5 DOTs per 1000 cases (95% CI, -282.1 to -114.9)]. There was no excess in out-of-hour visits [DID estimate, -4.43 events per 1000 cases (95% CI, -12.8 to 3.97)] or hospitalizations [DID estimate, -0.08 events per 1000 cases (95% CI, -0.48 to 0.31)]. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings suggest that financial incentives to medical facilities for not prescribing antibiotics were associated with reductions in prescriptions for antibiotics without adverse health care consequences. Japan's new health policy provided us with policy options for immediately reducing inappropriate antibiotic prescriptions by relatively small financial incentives.

来源:Int J Epidemiol,查看原文。版权归原作者所有。

引用

  1. Okubo Y, Nishi A, Michels KB, et al. The consequence of financial incentives for not prescribing antibiotics: a Japan's nationwide quasi-experiment. Int J Epidemiol. 2022. PMID: 35353127. doi:10.1093/ije/dyac057

供执业医师工作参考,不替代临床判断;数值与分级以指南原文为准。