爱尔兰国家骨科登记处遭网络攻击:事件经过与后果分析
2021年5月14日爱尔兰公共卫生系统遭网络攻击,爱尔兰国家骨科登记处(INOR)全面停摆。研究纳入使用INOR的全部九家医院,评估停机时长、患者危害及数据应急与核对成本。
要点
- INOR在九家医院的中位停机时间为134天(范围119至272天)。
- 停机期间纸质应急方案实现100%病例捕获,未发现严重不良患者事件。
核心结论
- 网络攻击导致的数据采集与可及性中断被应急计划成功应对,但数据保存与核对需要大量财务成本和额外资源。
研究设计与样本
- 纳入使用INOR的全部九家医院进行数据收集;INOR自2014年建立以来已推广至全部八家公立择期医院,覆盖所有髋关节和膝关节置换术,另有一家私立医院也被纳入并计划扩大私立部门覆盖。
- 查询各机构记录和INOR中央记录,收集与INOR非受控停机直接相关的客观数据,包括停机时长、应急方法、应急数据质量、患者不良事件、数据挽救与核对方法及成本。
- 成本按额外完成的人时乘以员工时薪估算;九家医院员工被要求提供因攻击而额外工作的人时,并通过观察各单位核对单个病例所需时间乘以该单位病例数进行佐证;人员包括护士、临床护理专家和不同级别的医生;人时费率采用Health Service Executive公布的薪资标准计算。
主要发现
- INOR在九个站点中位停机134天(范围119至272天)。
- 未发现严重不良患者事件。
- 立即实施的纸质备用方法使停机期间病例捕获率达到100%。
- 数据核对需要额外2850人时,估计成本为181000至216000美元。
- 据各医院INOR负责人访谈报告,网络攻击对手术室效率产生负面影响,因额外纸质数据采集导致手术间延迟,扰乱病房和门诊的患者流程,并在应急期间因额外纸质要求扰乱资源分配和员工能力。
临床怎么用
- 作者认为,除强有力的预防性安全措施外,国家登记处和其他医疗系统应准备二级数据备份设施和可靠的备用程序以应对此类事件。
局限性
- 原文未报告局限性。
以上解读依据论文摘要(全文未开放获取或许可不允许翻译转载)。
原文
BACKGROUND: On May 14, 2021, a criminal cyberattack was launched against the Irish public healthcare system, the Health Service Executive, resulting in a complete shutdown of all national healthcare computer systems, including the Irish National Orthopaedic Register (INOR). Cyberattacks of this kind occur sporadically, and postevent analyses can inform future preparedness efforts, but few such analyses have been published. QUESTION/PURPOSE: What was the impact of the cyberattack in terms of (1) registry downtime, (2) harms to patients, and (3) costs to the INOR for data contingency and reconciliation? METHODS: All nine hospitals using the INOR were included for data collection. Since establishment in 2014, the INOR has been rolled out to all eight public elective hospitals, capturing all hip and knee arthroplasty procedures. One private hospital was also captured, with plans to expand the private sector coverage. Individual institutional records and central INOR records were queried with respect to downtime, potential harms to patients (including intraoperative complications because of a lack of data on existing implanted components and complications directly attributed to delayed or canceled procedures), and costs related to additional person-hours addressing data reconciliation. Objective data directly related to the uncontrolled INOR downtime were collected, including duration of downtime, contingency methods employed, quality of contingency data collected, adverse patient events, methods of data salvage and reconciliation, and the cost of data contingency and reconciliation measures. Costs were estimated by the additional person-hours of work completed, multiplied by the hourly rate of that employee. Employees at each of the nine hospitals were asked to provide their additional person-hours of work performed because of the attack. These hours were corroborated by observing the time taken at each unit to reconcile data for single cases multiplied by the number of cases at that unit. Employees included nurses, clinical nurse specialists, and doctors of various grades. Person-hour rates were calculated using the Health Service Executive's published salary scales. RESULTS: The INOR suffered a median downtime of 134 days (range 119 to 272 days) across nine sites. No serious adverse patient events were identified. The immediate implementation of a paperwork fallback method for the INOR successfully resulted in 100% case capture during the downtime. However, 2850 additional person-hours were required for data reconciliation at an estimated cost of USD 181,000 to USD 216,000. More subjectively, as reported by interviews with INOR leads at each hospital, the cyberattack negatively impacted operating room efficiency with delays between procedures because of additional paperwork data collection, disrupted patient flow for paperwork data collection on the ward level and in the outpatient clinics, and disrupted resource allocations and staff capabilities because of additional paperwork requirements during the contingency period. CONCLUSION: Disruptions to data collection and data accessibility after this cyberattack were successfully countered by a contingency plan; however, substantial financial costs and additional resources were required for data conservation and reconciliation. CLINICAL RELEVANCE: In addition to robust preventative security measures, national registers and other healthcare systems should have secondary data backup facilities and reliable fallback procedures prepared for such events.
引用
- Russell SP, Fahey E, Curtin M, et al. The Irish National Orthopaedic Register Under Cyberattack: What Happened, and What Were the Consequences? Clin Orthop Relat Res. 2023. PMID: 37036406. doi:10.1097/CORR.0000000000002643
供执业医师工作参考,不替代临床判断;数值与分级以指南原文为准。