文献速递细菌感染、耐药与抗菌药物

可转让市场独占权延期促进抗生素研发的经济学分析

Transferrable Market Exclusivity Extensions to Promote Antibiotic Development: An Economic Analysis.
PubMed 文献 · Clin Infect Dis · 2020-01-01

该研究评估2018年美国国会REVAMP法案提出的可转让市场独占权凭证方案的经济影响。研究者匹配2007-2016年FDA批准的可能符合凭证资格的抗菌药与4年内面临仿制药竞争的快速通道药物,假设仿制药上市后支出下降75%,测算十年社会成本。

要点

  • 可转让市场独占权凭证虽有政治吸引力,但十年将增加支付方数十亿美元支出

核心结论

  • 可转让市场独占权延期是政治上有吸引力的鼓励新型抗生素研发的机制,但未来十年将花费公共和私人支付方数十亿美元。

研究设计与样本

  • 研究为经济学分析,识别2007-2016年FDA批准的可能符合独占权凭证资格的抗菌药,并将每种药物匹配至抗生素获批后4年内面临仿制药上市的最高收入快速通道药物。
  • 假设仿制药上市后支出下降75%,计算每种药物及十年总社会成本。

主要发现

  • 共识别10种可能符合独占权凭证资格的抗菌药,每种匹配至截至2019年7月面临仿制药上市的17种快速通道药物之一。

临床怎么用

  • 提示感染科医生与抗菌药物管理者关注该政策提案的财政影响,在支持新型抗生素研发与支付方成本之间权衡。

局限性

  • 原文未报告研究局限性。

以上解读依据论文摘要(全文未开放获取或许可不允许翻译转载)。

原文

BACKGROUND: To address the growing threat of multidrug-resistant organisms, policymakers are seeking ideas to promote development of novel antibiotics. In 2018, the REVAMP Act was proposed in Congress to reward manufacturers of certain novel antibiotics with transferrable market exclusivity vouchers. METHODS: We estimated the economic impact of this proposal by identifying antimicrobial drugs approved by the FDA from 2007-2016 that would likely have qualified for an exclusivity voucher and matching each drug to the highest-revenue fast-track drug facing generic entry within 4 years after the antibiotic was approved. Assuming a spending decrease of 75% after generic entry, we calculated the per-drug and total societal costs of these transferrable market exclusivity extensions over a decade. RESULTS: We identified 10 antimicrobials that would have qualified for an exclusivity voucher, each of which was matched with 1 of 17 fast-track drugs facing generic entry through July 2019. These 10 drugs had a median annual revenue before generic entry of $249 million (range, $26 million-$2.7 billion). Accounting for a 75% spending reduction after generic entry, the median excess spending associated with 12 months of extended exclusivity was $187 million, for a total of $4.5 billion over 10 years. CONCLUSIONS: While market exclusivity extensions are a politically appealing mechanism to encourage novel antibiotic development, this approach would cost public and private payers billions of dollars over the next decade.

来源:Clin Infect Dis,查看原文。版权归原作者所有。

引用

  1. Rome BN, Kesselheim AS. Transferrable Market Exclusivity Extensions to Promote Antibiotic Development: An Economic Analysis. Clin Infect Dis. 2020. PMID: 31630159. doi:10.1093/cid/ciz1039

供执业医师工作参考,不替代临床判断;数值与分级以指南原文为准。