文献速递衰弱、肌少症与跌倒老年慢病共病管理

熟练护理机构价值导向采购计划第一年的绩效与惩罚

Performance and Penalties in Year 1 of the Skilled Nursing Facility Value-Based Purchasing Program.
PubMed 文献 · J Am Geriatr Soc · 2019-12-18

该研究基于2019年SNF VBP项目,分析14 558家美国熟练护理机构的结构与患者特征与绩效惩罚的关联。结果显示72%机构被惩罚,21%获最大惩罚1.98%;农村、非营利、政府所有、高星级机构惩罚风险较低,而小型、低护士配置、低邮编收入及高衰弱患者比例机构惩罚风险较高。

要点

  • 72%的SNF被惩罚,21%获最大惩罚1.98%。
  • 农村、非营利、政府所有及高星级SNF惩罚风险更低。
  • 小型、低护士配置、低邮编收入及高衰弱患者比例SNF惩罚风险更高。

核心结论

  • SNF的结构和患者特征可能显著影响其在SNF VBP下的绩效表现。

研究设计与样本

  • 回顾性横断面分析,使用2019年SNF VBP的Nursing Home Compare数据,纳入14 558家美国Medicare熟练护理机构,进行机构层面回归。

主要发现

  • 全国72%(10 436)的SNF被惩罚,21%(2 996)获得最大惩罚1.98%。
  • 农村SNF相比城市被惩罚的比值比为0.85(95%CI 0.78-0.92,P<.001)。
  • ≤70床SNF相比>120床被惩罚的比值比为1.28(95%CI 1.15-1.42,P<.001);71-120床为1.15(95%CI 1.05-1.26,P=.003)。
  • 低护士配置相比高配置被惩罚的比值比为1.15(95%CI 1.03-1.27,P=.010);非营利相比营利为0.79(95%CI 0.72-0.87,P<.001);政府所有为0.72(95%CI 0.61-0.84,P<.001)。
  • 5星SNF相比1星被惩罚的比值比为0.47(95%CI 0.40-0.54,P<.001);低邮编收入SNF为1.17(95%CI 1.03-1.34,P=.019);高衰弱患者比例SNF为1.39(95%CI 1.21-1.60,P<.001)。

临床怎么用

  • 临床领导者可关注小型、低护士配置及服务高衰弱患者比例的SNF,因其在VBP下惩罚风险更高。

以上解读依据论文摘要(全文未开放获取或许可不允许翻译转载)。

原文

BACKGROUND/OBJECTIVES: Launched in October 2018, Medicare's Skilled Nursing Facility Value-Based Purchasing (SNF VBP) program mandates financial penalties for SNFs with high 30-day readmission rates. Our objective was to identify characteristics of SNFs associated with provider performance under the program. DESIGN: Retrospective cross-sectional analysis using Nursing Home Compare data for the 2019 SNF VBP. Facility-level regressions examined the relationship between structural characteristics (nursing home size, rurality, profit status, hospital affiliation, region, and Star Ratings) and patient characteristics (neighborhood income, race/ethnicity, dual eligibility, disability, and frailty) and facility performance. SETTING: US Medicare. PARTICIPANTS: A total of 14 558 SNFs. MEASUREMENTS: The 2019 SNF VBP performance scores and penalties. RESULTS: Nationally, 72% (10 436) of SNFs were penalized; 21% (2996) received the maximum penalty of 1.98%. In multivariate analyses, rural SNFs were less likely to be penalized (odds ratio [OR] = 0.85; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 0.78-0.92; P < .001; vs urban), while small SNFs were more likely to be penalized (≤70 beds: OR = 1.28; 95% CI = 1.15-1.42; P < .001; 71-120 beds: OR = 1.15; 95% CI = 1.05-1.26; P = .003; vs >120 beds). SNFs with lower nurse staffing had higher odds of penalties (low: OR = 1.15; 95% CI = 1.03-1.27; P = .010; vs high); nonprofit and government-owned SNFs had lower odds of penalties (OR = 0.79; 95% CI = 0.72-0.87; P < .001; government: OR = 0.72; 95% CI = 0.61-0.84; P < .001; vs for profit); and SNFs with higher Star Ratings had lower odds of penalties (5 stars: OR = 0.47; 95% CI = 0.40-0.54; P < .001; vs 1 star). In terms of patient population, SNFs located in low-income ZIP codes (OR = 1.17; 95% CI = 1.03-1.34; P = .019) or serving a high proportion of frail patients (OR = 1.39; 95% CI = 1.21-1.60; P < .001) were more likely to be penalized than other SNFs. SNFs with high proportions of dual, black, Hispanic, or disabled patients did not have higher odds of penalization. CONCLUSION: Structural and patient characteristics of SNFs may significantly impact provider performance under the SNF VBP. These findings have implications for policy makers and clinical leaders seeking to improve quality and avoid unintended consequences with VBP in SNFs. J Am Geriatr Soc 68:826-834, 2020.

来源:J Am Geriatr Soc,查看原文。版权归原作者所有。

引用

  1. Qi AC, Luke AA, Crecelius C, et al. Performance and Penalties in Year 1 of the Skilled Nursing Facility Value-Based Purchasing Program. J Am Geriatr Soc. 2019. PMID: 31850532. doi:10.1111/jgs.16299

供执业医师工作参考,不替代临床判断;数值与分级以指南原文为准。