英国质量与结果框架绩效付费项目对初级保健质量的影响:系统综述与定量合成
该系统综述评估英国质量与结果框架(QOF)绩效付费激励引入与撤销对初级保健质量的一年和三年影响。纳入30项研究,其中11项提供定量合成数据。结果显示激励引入一年后记录质量较激励前趋势预测值改善(83项指标,中位变化6.1个百分点),但三年时改善不一致;激励撤销后一年和三年记录质量均较预测值下降。
要点
- QOF激励引入一年后记录质量中位改善6.1个百分点,但三年时改善不一致。
- 激励撤销后一年和三年记录质量分别中位下降10.7和12.8个百分点。
- 复杂过程指标(如糖尿病足筛查)变化最大,简单过程指标和中间结局变化较小。
核心结论
- QOF激励在一年内持续改善初级保健记录质量,超越激励前趋势预测,但三年时影响不一致且不明显优于趋势。
- 激励撤销后获得的改善似乎逆转,且撤销后质量下降幅度通常匹配或超过引入时的改善幅度。
研究设计与样本
- 系统综述与定量合成,检索MEDLINE、Embase、CINAHL、PsycINFO和Scopus从2004年1月1日至2024年9月3日。
- 纳入采用重复横断面或队列设计、在激励引入或撤销前后进行一致测量的研究;定量合成要求至少三个时间点。
- 共纳入30项研究,其中11项提供定量合成数据;采用中断时间序列分析提取的原始数据,报告变化的中位数和四分位距(IQR)。
主要发现
- 激励引入一年后,83项指标记录质量较激励前趋势预测值中位改善6.1(IQR 1.9至14.6)个百分点。
- 激励引入三年后,72项指标中位变化0.7(IQR -2.1至8.9)个百分点,改善不一致。
- 激励撤销一年后,31项指标中位变化-10.7(IQR -17.9至-3.8)个百分点;三年后31项指标中位变化-12.8(IQR -21.0至-4.4)个百分点。
- 激励前一年绩效较低的过程指标改善更大;复杂过程指标(如糖尿病足筛查)变化最大,简单过程(如血压测量)、中间结局和治疗指标变化较小。
- 对同时有引入和撤销数据的14项指标,三年时激励引入中位变化1.4(IQR -0.9至4.6)个百分点增加,而激励撤销中位变化3.9(IQR 2.2至11.6)个百分点下降。
关键数值与推荐
- 激励引入一年后83项指标中位变化6.1(IQR 1.9至14.6)个百分点。
- 激励引入三年后72项指标中位变化0.7(IQR -2.1至8.9)个百分点。
- 激励撤销一年后31项指标中位变化-10.7(IQR -17.9至-3.8)个百分点。
- 激励撤销三年后31项指标中位变化-12.8(IQR -21.0至-4.4)个百分点。
- 14项指标三年时激励引入中位变化1.4(IQR -0.9至4.6)个百分点,激励撤销中位变化3.9(IQR 2.2至11.6)个百分点下降。
临床怎么用
- 绩效付费激励可在短期(一年)内提升初级保健记录质量,尤其对基线绩效较低的复杂过程指标。
- 长期(三年)激励效果可能减弱,需关注激励撤销后质量下降的风险并及时调整管理策略。
- 设计绩效付费项目时应考虑指标复杂度及撤销激励的潜在负面后果,避免质量改善逆转。
局限性
- 无法进行Meta分析,采用中位数和四分位距进行定量合成,异质性可能影响结果解释。
- 仅11项研究提供定量合成数据,部分指标数据有限,尤其撤销激励相关证据仅基于31项指标。
- 研究设计为重复横断面或队列,可能存在偏倚,采用混合方法评估工具评估偏倚风险。
以上解读依据论文摘要(全文未开放获取或许可不允许翻译转载)。
原文
OBJECTIVE: To systematically review the one and three year impact on quality of care of the introduction and withdrawal of financial incentives in the UK Quality and Outcomes Framework pay-for-performance programme. DESIGN: Systematic review with quantitative synthesis. DATA SOURCES: MEDLINE, Embase, CINAHL, PsycINFO, and Scopus databases were searched from 1 January 2004 to 3 September 2024. STUDY SELECTION: Eligible studies used repeated cross sectional or cohort designs with consistent measurement before and after incentive introduction or withdrawal. Studies with a minimum of three time points before and after intervention were included in quantitative synthesis. DATA EXTRACTION: Analysis used both reported impact if available and de novo interrupted time series analysis of extracted raw data if not reported by the original study. DATA SYNTHESIS: Meta-analysis was not appropriate; findings were quantitatively synthesised by reporting medians and interquartile ranges of changes in quality or reported narratively. Risk of bias was assessed using the Mixed Methods Assessment Tool. RESULTS: 30 studies were included, with 11 providing data for quantitative synthesis. Across all indicators, evidence was found of improvement in recorded quality at one year after incentive introduction (83 indicators; median change compared with that predicted by pre-incentivisation trends 6.1 (interquartile range (IQR) 1.9 to 14.6) percentage points) but less consistently at three years (72 indicators; median change 0.7 (-2.1 to 8.9) percentage points). Impact was higher for process indicators with lower performance in the year before incentivisation. Incentive withdrawal was associated with reduction in recorded quality compared with predicted at both one year (31 indicators; median change -10.7 (IQR -17.9 to -3.8) percentage points) and three years (31 indicators; median change -12.8 (-21.0 to -4.4) percentage points). The largest changes with both incentive introduction and withdrawal were for complex process indicators such as diabetes foot screening, with smaller changes in simple processes such as blood pressure measurement, intermediate outcomes, and treatment indicators. For all types of indicators, the reduction in quality following incentive withdrawal generally matched or exceeded the gains observed after incentive introduction (for example, for 14 indicators with data for both, median change at three years for incentive introduction was a 1.4 (IQR -0.9 to 4.6) percentage point increase versus a 3.9 (IQR 2.2 to 11.6) decrease for incentive withdrawal). CONCLUSION: Quality and Outcomes Framework incentives consistently improved quality of care at one year beyond that predicted by pre-incentivisation trends, but by three years the impact was inconsistent and not clearly better than trend. Gains from incentivisation seemed to reverse after incentive withdrawal. STUDY REGISTRATION: Prospero CRD42023467627.
引用
- Ho L, Mercer SW, Henderson D, et al. Effect of UK Quality and Outcomes Framework pay-for-performance programme on quality of primary care: systematic review with quantitative synthesis. BMJ. 2025. PMID: 40562441. doi:10.1136/bmj-2024-083424
供执业医师工作参考,不替代临床判断;数值与分级以指南原文为准。