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脊髓灰质炎《国际卫生条例》突发事件委员会第四十六次会议声明

WHO News · 2026-11-13 08:00

正文 · 中文译文

世界卫生组织总干事于2026年9月30日通过视频会议召集了《国际卫生条例》(IHR或《条例》)突发事件委员会第46次会议,讨论脊髓灰质炎病毒的国际传播问题,受影响国家参会,世界卫生组织秘书处提供支持。突发事件委员会结合2026年阻断地方性流行野生1型脊髓灰质炎病毒(WPV1)传播以及到2028年阻止循环疫苗衍生2型脊髓灰质炎病毒(cVDPV2)疫情并随后认证WPV1根除和cVDPV2消除的全球目标,审查了关于野生1型脊髓灰质炎病毒(WPV1)和循环疫苗衍生脊髓灰质炎病毒(cVDPV)的最新流行病学数据。会议收到了关于以下国家疫情形势的技术更新:阿富汗、中非共和国、刚果民主共和国、埃塞俄比亚、巴基斯坦、南苏丹和苏丹。 《国际卫生条例》修正案由第七十七届世界卫生大会通过2024年6月第WHA77.17号决议采纳,一般于2025年9月19日生效。1 野生脊髓灰质炎病毒 自2026年5月上次紧急委员会会议以来,两个流行国家阿富汗(22例)和巴基斯坦(3例)共报告了25例新增WPV1病例。阿富汗的病例报告自该国南部和东部地区,而巴基斯坦的病例报告自开伯尔-普什图省(KP)。2026年迄今已报告29例WPV1病例:阿富汗25例,巴基斯坦4例。2025年报告了52例WPV1病例:阿富汗21例,巴基斯坦31例。2024年共报告99例WPV1病例。环境监测方面,2026年迄今共报告204份WPV1阳性样本(阿富汗76份,巴基斯坦128份)。2025年共报告747份WPV1阳性样本;阿富汗94份,巴基斯坦651份,德国2份。2025年10月上半月之后,德国未再报告WPV1检出。 尽管WPV1病例和环境样本阳性的总体趋势在下降,但委员会关切地注意到,两个地方性流行国家持续存在WPV1传播,特别是在南部(南阿富汗—奎达区块)和中部(巴基斯坦西北部/南开伯尔-普赫图赫瓦—阿富汗东南部)跨境流行病学走廊沿线,以及巴基斯坦卡拉奇。委员会注意到,持续的本地WPV1传播仍集中在三个关键地理区域:阿富汗南部地区、南开伯尔-普赫图赫瓦(KP)和卡拉奇。阿富汗南部地区仍是最大关切区域,由于人群免疫力低下而存在高强度传播。南开伯尔-普赫图赫瓦继续面临重大行动和安全挑战,阻碍高质量疫苗接种活动的实施。委员会欣慰地注意到,在南KP最近两轮疫苗接种活动后,未接种疫苗儿童数量有所减少,并强调需要确保在即将开展的疫苗接种轮次中所有儿童都能持续且全面地获得接种。卡拉奇尽管2026年环境监测阳性率显著下降,但一些地区仍显示本地WPV1传播。这表明这些地区存在大量免疫力低下的人群聚集,使更广泛的流行病学区块持续面临风险。 委员会注意到北部跨境流行病学走廊(包括巴基斯坦白沙瓦和阿富汗东部地区)取得了令人鼓舞的进展,规划质量有所改善。然而,白沙瓦近期1型野生脊髓灰质炎病毒(WPV1)检出量略有上升,加之阿富汗东部地区过去六个月检出量呈上升趋势,表明所取得的成果仍然脆弱。阿富汗东部地区的检出主要提示来自该国南部地区的输入。委员会强调,需要维持高人群免疫水平,尤其是弱势和高风险人群群体,并在整个流行病学走廊保持敏感的监测,以保护和巩固所取得的成果。 委员会还注意到奎达区块取得了令人鼓舞的进展,特别是环境阳性样本的下降。然而,委员会强调,由于毗邻的阿富汗南部地区WPV1传播持续严重,加之疫苗接种活动质量参差不齐和常规免疫覆盖率低,这些成果仍然脆弱。委员会强调,需要采取有针对性的措施,通过在免疫缺口持续存在的地区提升人群免疫水平,维持和巩固已取得的进展。 关于分子流行病学,2020年至2023年间遗传生物多样性总体下降。然而,2024年观察到遗传生物多样性增加,需要将两个遗传簇拆分为八个遗传簇,其中七个在2025年活跃,四个在2026年仍保持活跃。剩余的传播链在免疫覆盖率持续偏低的人群和地区继续循环,尤其是两个地方性流行国家之间中部和南部跨境流行病学走廊沿线的地区。直至2026年中期,仍有文献记录显示这两个WPV1地方性流行国家之间存在跨境传播共享的证据。 阿富汗和巴基斯坦继续实施密集且基本同步的活动计划,重点是在核心 reservoir 中实现高疫苗接种覆盖率,并确保及时有效地应对两国其他地区检测到的 WPV1。在阿富汗,2025 年开展了两次全国性和五次次国家级疫苗接种活动,而 2026 年迄今已开展两次次国家级和一次全国性活动。此外,2025 年在东部、南部和东南部地区的高风险地区以及 2026 年在东部地区的高风险地区实施了有针对性的分剂次 IPV 活动。在巴基斯坦,2025 年开展了五次全国性和一次次国家级疫苗接种活动,而 2026 年迄今已开展两次全国性和两次次国家级活动。2025 年和 2026 年还在卡拉奇、奎达区块和拉合尔实施了有针对性的分剂次 IPV 活动。 在阿富汗,活动继续采用固定站点策略开展,并重点努力加强运营和沟通方式,以最大化该模式下目标儿童的覆盖范围。由于安全方面的担忧,自2024年10月以来未再实施挨家挨户的接种活动,限制了对所有儿童的全面活动覆盖;与此同时,女性作为疫苗接种卫生工作者的总体参与比例仍然非常低,尤其是在南部地区。委员会表示关切的是,在缺乏挨家挨户接种活动且女性卫生工作者参与有限的情况下,固定站点活动往往无法覆盖所有儿童,尤其是年幼儿童,这可能促使脊髓灰质炎在阿富汗境内及境外进一步地理扩散。 委员会注意到其关于在阿富汗和巴基斯坦之间边境口岸实施全年龄段接种的建议继续得到落实,并强调持续这些努力以最大限度降低跨境脊髓灰质炎病毒传播风险的重要性。此外,委员会强调,在两个国家,尤其是在边境地区,实现并维持始终如一的高水平人群免疫力,对于有效预防跨境传播具有至关重要的意义。 委员会赞赏地注意到,巴基斯坦各级在脊灰消灭方面展现出强有力的领导和高级别承诺,包括总理办公室的参与。委员会还确认,国家和省级报告的覆盖率以及批质量保证抽样(LQAS)通过率持续保持高位。然而,委员会注意到,地区一级的质量仍然参差不齐且不稳定,包括在奎达区块、南开伯尔-普什图省和巴基斯坦中部区块等几个关键地区,原因在于行动挑战、某些社区的疫苗犹豫以及普遍存在的不安全局势,尤其是在开伯尔-普什图省和俾路支省。巴基斯坦的项目在持续、有效地覆盖南开伯尔-普什图省所有目标儿童方面仍面临重大挑战,该地区目前正经历该国最严重的WPV1传播。卡拉奇近期的改善虽然令人鼓舞,但尚未达到消灭级项目质量,因为这座大都市的某些地区仍存在本地传播。 总之,现有数据表明,全球WPV1传播在地理上仍局限于两个流行国家。尽管过去12个月的流行病学进展令人鼓舞,但各地进展仍不均衡。在若干关键地区已注意到可衡量的进展,包括阿富汗东部地区和巴基斯坦的白沙瓦、奎达和卡拉奇区块。然而,最近阿富汗东部和白沙瓦WPV1检出增加,包括脊灰病例和阳性环境样本,构成重大风险。尽管有所改善,WPV1传播在巴基斯坦南开伯尔-普赫图赫瓦省以及阿富汗南部地区仍然严重,持续报告WPV1病例和阳性环境样本。委员会注意到,关键地区及其他地区仍存在规划质量差距,持续努力加强监测、改善常规和补充免疫、全面实施技术咨询小组的方案改进建议以及2025年末开展的卡拉奇方案审计建议,并确保接触到所有儿童,对于阻断WPV1传播和实现根除至关重要。委员会强调,就脊灰根除而言,阿富汗和巴基斯坦构成一个单一的流行病学区块,持续存在跨境传播风险。因此,两国规划在全球脊灰根除倡议(GPEI)支持下,在国家和国家以下各级保持强有力的跨境协调仍然至关重要,并且c 继续努力实现同步规划实施,特别是在边境地区。两国还应保持密切协调,以覆盖并为跨境流动人群接种疫苗,包括从巴基斯坦返回阿富汗的无证移民,其流动继续加剧该规划的行动挑战。 循环疫苗衍生脊髓灰质炎病毒(cVDPV) 2026年(截至9月15日),全球20个国家共报告155例cVDPV病例和61份环境检出。在2026年报告的155例cVDPV病例中,118例为cVDPV2,24例为cVDPV1,13例为cVDPV3。在2026年报告的61份阳性环境样本中,55份为cVDPV2,5份为cVDPV1,1份为cVDPV3。2025年,全球30个国家共报告246例cVDPV病例和249份确诊cVDPV环境检出。刚果民主共和国和尼日利亚在2026年合计报告88例cVDPV2病例,分别为52例和36例,截至9月中旬约占全球cVDPV2病例数的75%。2025年,阿尔及利亚、吉布提和刚果民主共和国报告cVDPV1和cVDPV2共同循环,而尼日利亚、乍得和喀麦隆报告cVDPV2和cVDPV3共同循环。2026年,尼日利亚和乍得报告cVDPV2和cVDPV3共同循环,而南苏丹报告cVDPV1和cVDPV2共同循环。 截至9月15日,2026年已检测到23个独特的cVDPV2新发群体,而2025年为35个、2024年为31个、2023年为28个。在2026年检测到的23起cVDPV2新发事件中,有9起为新发事件(均为nOPV2衍生)。自2021年引入以来,已接种超过20亿剂nOPV2,共有53起cVDPV2新发事件与其相关。委员会指出,与Sabin OPV2相比,nOPV2继续表现出显著更高的遗传稳定性和大幅更低的毒力回复风险。超过80%的受cVDPV2影响国家通过使用nOPV2的三轮或更少补充免疫活动(SIA)阻断了疫情。然而,当疫情应对活动之间的间隔超过四周或疫苗接种质量欠佳时,新发cVDPV2的风险会增加,这凸显了及时且高质量免疫工作的必要性。 2026年(截至9月15日),已报告24例cVDPV1病例,其中南苏丹10例、埃塞俄比亚9例、老挝人民民主共和国3例、马达加斯加2例。2025年报告了3例cVDPV1病例,阿尔及利亚、刚果民主共和国和老挝人民民主共和国各1例。此外,根据环境监测检测结果,吉布提和以色列报告了cVDPV1疫情(吉布提和以色列各10次检测)。 2026年(截至9月15日),已报告13例cVDPV3,其中尼日利亚11例,尼日尔和乍得各1例。2026年,尼日利亚同时受到cVDPV2和cVDPV3疫情的影响。2025年,共报告15例cVDPV3病例,其中尼日利亚8例,乍得4例,几内亚2例,喀麦隆1例。 尽管与cVDPV2相比,cVDPV1和cVDPV3的全球传播仍处于较低水平,但委员会关切地注意到2026年cVDPV1和cVDPV3病例数呈上升趋势,表明人群免疫力低下,尤其是脆弱人群群体中,其原因在于常规免疫接种率低,并因资源缺乏导致预防性bOPV运动无法开展而进一步加剧。这凸显了通过强有力的常规免疫接种维持对1型和3型脊髓灰质炎病毒高人群免疫力的至关重要性,以及在发现任何病毒时确保及时、高质量应对活动的必要性。 委员会注意到,cVDPV疫情的风险在很大程度上由以下因素共同驱动:可及性差、不安全局势、零剂次和免疫不足儿童高度集中,以及持续的人口流离失所。 结论 委员会一致认为,脊髓灰质炎病毒的国际传播风险继续构成国际关注的突发公共卫生事件(PHEIC),并建议将临时建议再延长三个月。 委员会在全面审查流行病学和规划情况后,一致得出结论:该事件不构成大流行病紧急事件。 在得出脊灰病毒国际传播风险继续构成国际关注的突发公共卫生事件(PHEIC)这一结论时,委员会考虑了以下因素: WPV1国际传播的持续风险 委员会注意到,由于以下因素,WPV1的国际传播风险持续存在: 核心 reservoir 中WPV1传播持续存在,尤其是在阿富汗南部地区以及巴基斯坦的卡拉奇和南开伯尔-普什图省。 部分地区活动质量持续不一致,加之一些关键区域存在大量未免疫和免疫不足儿童,其驱动因素包括:不安全局势导致的可及性受限(如南开伯尔-普什图省、阿富汗南部)、运营表现欠佳(如阿富汗的站点到站点疫苗接种模式及巴基斯坦部分地区的质量不均衡),以及某些社区的疫苗犹豫(如南开伯尔-普什图省、奎达区块、阿富汗东南部),所有这些均导致人群免疫缺口。 两个流行国家之间的人口流动持续存在,包括从巴基斯坦返回阿富汗的回归者,导致跨境WPV1传播风险持续存在。 人口从两个流行国家流向其他邻国和遥远国家,显示存在国际传播风险(最新例证:2025年末国际传播至德国)。 cVDPV国际传播的持续风险 基于以下因素,循环型疫苗衍生脊灰病毒(cVDPV)的国际传播风险似乎仍然很高: 乍得湖流域持续存在cVDPV2传播,尤其是尼日利亚高风险地区,并持续存在传播潜力。 过去六个月刚果民主共和国cVDPV2传播加剧,包括与安哥拉接壤的省份。 非洲之角持续存在cVDPV2传播,包括索马里、埃塞俄比亚和也门。非洲之角国家继续经历相互叠加的人道主义和卫生突发事件,难以及时开展高质量疫苗接种活动。 也门北部各省存在大量未免疫和易感儿童(超过450万五岁以下儿童),由于不安全和通行受限,尚未针对持续发生的cVDPV2疫情实施适当的OPV应对。这些地区急性弛缓性麻痹(AFP)粪便标本的及时运送也持续面临挑战。在尼日利亚、索马里南部和中部全面覆盖所有儿童也仍然是一项重大挑战。 包括非洲区域一些国家在内的十八个国家尚未将第二剂IPV纳入其常规免疫规划,而若干非洲国家第一剂IPV(IPV1)覆盖率仍然较低。 自2016年全球停用OPV2以来,幼儿肠道黏膜免疫差距不断扩大,且某些地区零剂次儿童高度集中。 一些国家常规免疫和脊灰灭活疫苗(IPV)覆盖率持续偏低,导致免疫空白持续存在,表明1型循环疫苗衍生脊灰病毒(cVDPV1)和3型循环疫苗衍生脊灰病毒(cVDPV3)暴发的风险持续存在。不断上升的

正文 · 英文原文

The 46th meeting of the Emergency Committee under the International Health Regulations (IHR or Regulations) on the international spread of poliovirus was convened by the WHO Director-General on 30 September 2026 via video conference with affected countries, supported by the WHO Secretariat. The Emergency Committee reviewed the latest epidemiological data on wild poliovirus type 1 (WPV1) and circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV) in the context of the global targets to interrupt endemic WPV1 transmission in 2026 and to stop cVDPV2 outbreaks by 2028 with subsequent certification of WPV1 eradication and cVDPV2 elimination. Technical updates were received about the situation in the following countries: Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Pakistan, South Sudan, and Sudan. Amendments to the IHR, adopted by the Seventy-seventh World Health Assembly, through resolution WHA77.17 in June 2024, entered into force, generally, on 19 September 2025.1 Wild poliovirus Since the last Emergency Committee meeting in May 2026, 25 new WPV1 cases have been reported from the two endemic countries, Afghanistan (22) and Pakistan (3). The cases in Afghanistan were reported from the South and East Regions of the country, while in Pakistan the cases were reported from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. In 2026 to date, 29 WPV1 cases have been reported: 25 in Afghanistan and four in Pakistan. In 2025, 52 WPV1 cases were reported: 21 in Afghanistan and 31 in Pakistan. A total of 99 WPV1 cases were reported in 2024. For environmental surveillance, a total of 204 WPV1 positive samples have been reported so far in 2026 (76 from Afghanistan and 128 from Pakistan). In 2025, a total of 747 WPV1 positive samples were reported; 94 from Afghanistan, 651 from Pakistan and two from Germany. No further WPV1 detections were reported from Germany after the first half of October 2025. While the overall trajectory of WPV1 cases and environmental sample positivity is declining, the Committee noted with concern the continued WPV1 transmission in both endemic countries, particularly along the southern (South Afghanistan–Quetta Block) and central (Northwest Pakistan/South Khyber Pakhtunkhwa–Southeast Afghanistan) cross-border epidemiological corridors, as well as in Karachi, Pakistan. The Committee noted that sustained local WPV1 transmission continues to be concentrated in three critical geographies: the South Region of Afghanistan, South Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), and Karachi. The South Region of Afghanistan remains the area of greatest concern, with intense transmission due to low population immunity. Southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa continues to present significant operational and security challenges that impede implementation of high-quality vaccination activities. The Committee was encouraged to note a reduction in the number of children remaining unvaccinated following the two most recent vaccination campaigns in the South KP and emphasized the need to ensure consistent and full access to all children in upcoming vaccination rounds. Karachi, despite a significant decline in environmental surveillance positivity in 2026, continues to show local WPV1 transmission in some geographies. This indicates the presence of substantial population pockets with low immunity in these geographies, placing the wider epidemiological block at continued risk. The Committee noted encouraging progress in the northern cross-border epidemiological corridor, encompassing Peshawar in Pakistan and the East Region of Afghanistan, where programme quality has improved. However, the recent slight increase in WPV1 detections in Peshawar, together with the upward trajectory of detections in the East Region of Afghanistan over the last six months, indicates that the gains made remain fragile. The detections in the East Region of Afghanistan mostly indicate introductions from the South Region of the country. The Committee emphasized the need to sustain high population immunity, particularly among vulnerable and high-risk population groups, and sensitive surveillance across the epidemiological corridor to protect and consolidate the gains achieved. The Committee also noted encouraging progress in the Quetta Block, particularly the decline in positive environmental samples. However, the Committee emphasized that these gains remain fragile because of continued intense WPV1 transmission in the adjoining South Region of Afghanistan, as well as uneven quality of vaccination campaigns and low routine immunization coverage. The Committee underscored the need for targeted measures to sustain and consolidate the progress achieved by boosting population immunity in areas with persistent immunity gaps. Regarding molecular epidemiology, there has been an overall decrease in genetic biodiversity between 2020 and 2023. However, an increase in genetic biodiversity was observed in 2024, necessitating a split of two genetic clusters into eight genetic clusters, seven of which were active in 2025, and four remain active in 2026. The remaining chains of transmission continue to circulate in populations and geographies with persistently low immunization coverage, particularly in districts along the central and southern cross-border epidemiological corridors between the two endemic countries. Evidence of shared cross-border transmission between the two WPV1-endemic countries was documented as recently as mid-2026. Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to implement an intensive and mostly synchronized campaign schedule, with a focus on achieving high vaccination coverage in core reservoirs and ensuring timely and effective responses to WPV1 detections in other areas of both countries. In Afghanistan, two nationwide and five sub-national vaccination campaigns were conducted in 2025, while two sub-national and one nationwide campaign have been conducted in 2026 so far. Additionally, targeted fractional-dose IPV campaigns were implemented in high-risk areas of the East, South and Southeast Regions in 2025, and in high-risk areas of the East Region in 2026. In Pakistan, five nationwide and one sub-national vaccination campaign were conducted in 2025, while two nationwide and two sub-national campaigns have been conducted in 2026 so far. Targeted fractional-dose IPV campaigns were also implemented in Karachi, Quetta Bloc and Lahore in 2025 and 2026. In Afghanistan, campaigns continue to be conducted using the site-to-site strategy, with focused efforts to strengthen operational and communication approaches to maximize coverage of target children under this modality. House-to-house campaigns have not been implemented since October 2024 due to security concerns, limiting full campaign access to all children; at the same time, the overall inclusion of women as vaccination health workers remains very low, particularly in the South Region. The Committee expressed concern that, in the absence of house-to-house campaigns and with limited participation of women health workers, site-to-site campaigns often fail to reach all children, particularly younger children, which could contribute to further geographic spread within Afghanistan and beyond. The Committee noted the continued implementation of its recommendation for all-age vaccination at border crossing points between Afghanistan and Pakistan and emphasized the importance of sustaining these efforts to minimize the risk of cross-border poliovirus transmission. In addition, the Committee emphasized the critical importance of achieving and sustaining consistently high levels of population immunity in both countries, particularly in border areas, to effectively prevent cross-border transmission. The Committee noted with appreciation the strong leadership and high-level commitment to polio eradication in Pakistan at all levels, including the engagement of the Prime Minister’s Office. The Committee also acknowledged consistently high reported coverage and Lot Quality Assurance Sampling (LQAS) pass rates at the national and provincial levels. However, the Committee noted that the quality at district level remains variable and inconsistent, including in several critical areas such as Quetta Bloc, South KP and the Central Pakistan Bloc, due to operational challenges, vaccine hesitancy is certain communities, and prevailing insecurity, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces. The programme in Pakistan continues to face substantial challenges in consistently and effectively reaching all target children in South KP, which is currently experiencing the most intense WPV1 transmission in the country. The recent improvements in Karachi, though encouraging, do not yet reflect eradication-level programme quality, as local transmission persists in some areas of the cosmopolitan city. In summary, available data indicate that global WPV1 transmission remains geographically confined to the two endemic countries. While epidemiological progress during the last 12 months has been encouraging, it remains uneven across geographies. Measurable progress has been noted in several key geographies including the East Region of Afghanistan and the Peshawar, Quetta and Karachi Blocs of Pakistan. However, recent increase in WPV1 detections in Eastern Afghanistan and Peshawar, including polio cases and positive environmental samples, constitute a significant risk. Notwithstanding the improvements, WPV1 transmission remains intense in South KP of Pakistan as well as in the Southern Region of Afghanistan, with continued reporting of WPV1 cases and positive environmental samples. The Committee noted that programme quality gaps persist across critical geographies and beyond, and that sustained efforts to strengthen surveillance, improve routine and supplementary immunization, fully implement programme improvement recommendations from the Technical Advisory Group and Karachi programme audit conducted in late 2025, and ensure access to all children will be essential to interrupt WPV1 transmission and achieve eradication. The Committee reinforced that Afghanistan and Pakistan constitute a single epidemiological bloc for the purposes of polio eradication, with a continued risk of cross-border transmission. It therefore remains essential that both country programmes, with support from the GPEI, maintain strong cross-border coordination at the national and subnational levels and continue efforts towards synchronized programme implementation, particularly in border areas. Both countries should also maintain close coordination to reach and vaccinate populations moving across the border, including undocumented migrants returning from Pakistan to Afghanistan, whose movement continues to compound the programme's operational challenges. Circulating vaccine derived polioviruses (cVDPV) In 2026 (as of 15 September), a total of 155 cVDPV cases and 61 environmental detections were reported globally across 20 countries. Of the 155 cVDPV cases reported in 2026, 118 were cVDPV2, 24 were cVDPV1, and 13 were cVDPV3. Of the 61 positive environmental samples reported in 2026, 55 were cVDPV2, five were cVDPV1, and one was cVDPV3. In 2025, a total of 246 cVDPV cases and 249 confirmed cVDPV environmental detections were reported globally across 30 countries. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Nigeria together reported 88 cVDPV2 cases in 2026, 52 and 36 respectively, accounting for about 75% of the global cVDPV2 caseload as of mid-September. In 2025, Algeria, Djibouti, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo reported co-circulation of cVDPV1 and cVDPV2, while Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon reported co-circulation of cVDPV2 and cVDPV3. In 2026, Nigeria and Chad reported co-circulation of cVDPV2 and cVDPV3, while South Sudan reported co-circulation of cVDPV1 and cVDPV2. As of 15 September, 23 unique cVDPV2 emergence groups have been detected in 2026, compared with 35 in 2025, 31 in 2024 and 28 in 2023. Of the 23 cVDPV2 emergences detected in 2026, nine were new emergences (all nOPV2 derived). Since its introduction in 2021, more than 2 billion doses of nOPV2 have been administered and a total of 53 cVDPV2 emergences have been associated with it. The Committee noted that nOPV2 continues to demonstrate significantly greater genetic stability and a substantially lower risk of reversion to neurovirulence compared to Sabin OPV2. More than 80% of cVDPV2-affected countries have interrupted outbreaks with three or fewer SIAs using nOPV2. However, the risk of new cVDPV2 emergences increases when the interval between outbreak response campaigns exceeds four weeks or when vaccination quality is suboptimal, underscoring the need for timely and high-quality immunization efforts. In 2026 (as of 15 September), 24 cVDPV1 cases have been reported, 10 from South Sudan, nine from Ethiopia, three from Lao People’s Democratic Republic and two from Madagascar. In 2025, three cVDPV1 cases were reported, one each from Algeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Lao People’s Democratic Republic. In addition, cVDPV1 outbreaks were reported in Djibouti and Israel, based on environmental surveillance detections (ten detections each from Djibouti and Israel). In 2026 (as of 15 September), 13 cVDPV3 have been reported, including 11 from Nigeria, one each from Niger and Chad. Nigeria is affected by outbreaks of both cVDPV2 and cVDPV3 in 2026. In 2025, 15 cVDPV3 cases were reported, eight from Nigeria, four from Chad, two from Guinea, and one from Cameroon. Although global transmission of cVDPV1 and cVDPV3 remains at lower levels compared to cVDPV2, the Committee noted with concern the rising trend in the numbed of cVDPV1 and cVDPV3 cases in 2026, indicating low population immunity, especially among the vulnerable population groups, due to low routine immunization and compounded by the lack of preventive bOPV campaigns due to lack of resources. This underscores the critical importance of sustaining high population immunity against type 1 and type 3 polioviruses through robust routine immunization, as well as ensuring timely and high-quality response activities in the event of any detections. The Committee noted that the risk of cVDPV outbreaks is largely driven by a combination of inaccessibility, insecurity, high concentrations of zero-dose and under-immunized children, and ongoing population displacement. Conclusion The Committee unanimously concluded that the risk of international spread of polioviruses continues to constitute a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) and recommended extending the Temporary Recommendations for a further three months. The Committee, after a thorough review of the epidemiological and programmatic situation, unanimously concluded that the event does not constitute a pandemic emergency. In reaching the conclusion that the risk of international spread of poliovirus continues to constitute a PHEIC, the Committee considered the following factors: Ongoing risk of WPV1 international spread The Committee noted that the risk of international spread of WPV1 persists due to the following factors: Ongoing WPV1 transmission in the core reservoirs, particularly in the southern region of Afghanistan and Karachi and South KP in Pakistan. Persistent inconsistencies in campaign quality and a substantial number of unimmunized and under-immunized children in some key areas, driven by access constraints due to insecurity (e.g. South KP, South Afghanistan), sub-optimal operational performance (e.g. site-to-site vaccination modality in Afghanistan and uneven quality in parts of Pakistan), and vaccine hesitancy in certain communities (e.g. South KP, Quetta Block, Southeast Afghanistan), all contributing to gaps in the population immunity. Ongoing population movement between the two endemic countries, including the returnees from Pakistan to Afghanistan, leading to continued risk of cross-border WPV1 transmission. Population movement from the two endemic countries to other neighbouring and distant countries, demonstrating risk of international spread (most recent example: international spread to Germany in late 2025). Ongoing risk of cVDPV international spread Based on the following factors, the risk of international spread of cVDPV appears to remain high: Continued cVDPV2 transmission in Lake Chad Basin, particularly in high-risk areas of Nigeria, with continued potential of spread. Intensifying cVDPV2 transmission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the last six months, including in provinces neighbouring Angola. Ongoing cVDPV2 transmission in the Horn of Africa, including Somalia, Ethiopia, and Yemen. The Horn of Africa countries continue to experience overlapping humanitarian and health emergencies, making it challenging to implement high-quality vaccination campaigns in a timely manner. A large pool of unimmunized and susceptible children in the northern governorates of Yemen (more than 4.5 million children aged less than five years), where a proper OPV response to the ongoing cVDPV2 outbreak has not yet been implemented due to insecurity and lack of access. Challenges also persist regarding timely shipment of AFP stool specimens from these areas. Full access to all children in Nigeria, southern and central Somalia also remains a significant challenge. Eighteen countries, including some in the African Region, have yet to introduce a second dose of IPV into their routine immunization schedules, while coverage with the first dose of IPV (IPV1) remains low in several African countries. A widening gap in intestinal mucosal immunity among young children since the global withdrawal of OPV2 in 2016, as well as high concentration of zero dose children in certain areas. Continued low routine immunization and IPV coverage in several countries, resulting in persistent immunity gaps, indicates an ongoing risk of cVDPV1 and cVDPV3 outbreaks. This is underscored by the rising

English
Statement of the Forty-sixth Meeting of the Polio IHR Emergency Committee
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